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Abstract. Ad hominem criticism seeks to discredit an argument by attacking the qualities of the arguer, rather than the
merits of the argument. Although there are compelling reasons to avoid ad hominem criticism, it may sometimes be
appropriate as a means of responding to ‘expert’ arguments advanced in public forums. However, conservation biologists
should evaluate the defamatory potential of any proposed ad hominem criticism and consider whether the criticism:
(1) impugns a person’s reputation in a trade, profession or business; (2) has a factual grounding that is based on evidence
that could be used in court; and (3) is better formulated as a statement of opinion than as a statement of fact. From a
defamation perspective, the purpose and context for an ad hominem criticism is critical and conservation biologists should
always consider whether, if viewed objectively, their conduct in making the criticism would be assessed as fair-minded,
reasonable, and supportive of debate over an issue of public interest. Isolated and unsupported ad hominem remarks should
not be made. Conservation biologists should also be aware that there are circumstances in which critiques of the methods,
analyses, logical approaches, and conclusions of an expert could be said to be defamatory of that person, but that courts
also recognise the importance of scientific debate. Conservation biologists should carefully consider the wording of any
proposed ad hominem criticism, particularly in terms of the precise facts to be alleged and the particular evaluative words
or phrases to be applied, and should also ensure that the criticism has a proper purpose, is well supported, and clearly
distinguishes between comments that express an opinion and those that state a fact.
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Introduction
The personal attacks on the distinguished district judge and
our colleagues were out of all bounds of civic and persua-
sive discourse – particularly when they came from the
parties. It does no credit to the arguments of the parties to
impugn the motives or the competence of the members of
this court; ad hominem attacks are not a substitute for
effective advocacy.1
The ‘advocacy’ referred to above differs, of course, from the
kinds of advocacy that conservation biologists typically
undertake. In the norm, conservation biologists advocate outside
of courtrooms and to audiences other than judicial officers. Even
so, the basic principle expressed in Judge Bybee’s remark – that
ad hominem criticism is unpersuasive and tends to obstruct
rather than enable debate – is relevant to conservation biologists
considering whether to use ad hominem criticism in their
advocacy efforts in public forums.
Certainly, ad hominem criticism has clear limitations as a
means of advocacy (Hoggan and Litwin 2016). It operates, for
example, through the creation of doubt and uncertainty rather
than by the contribution of positive knowledge and thus might,
in the end, do relatively little to improve understanding and
positively dispel misinformation. And, for obvious reasons, it
tends to inflame rather than to moderate debates.
Nonetheless, there are circumstances, if narrow, when ad
hominem criticism will be legitimate and compelling. The
principal objective of this article is to provide some basic
guidance about the defamatory potential of ad hominem criti-
cisms to those conservation biologists whomay wish to advance
such criticisms in public debates over environmental decisions
and policy choices. The article addresses five main issues
relating to defamation and advocacy in public forums:
(1) how ad hominem criticisms can be said to injure a person’s
reputation in a business, trade or profession;
(2) why ad hominem criticisms should have a strong factual
foundation;
(3) why ad hominem criticisms are often better expressed as
statements of opinion than as statements of fact;
1The quote is drawn from the dissenting opinion of Judge Bybee in Washington v Trump 853 F 3d 933 (9th Circuit, 2017), an appeal case before the United
States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit).
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(4) whether a critique of the methods, analyses, logical
approaches, and conclusions of an expert could be said to
be defamatory of that person; and
(5) whether a critique of a single item of work from a person
could support a more general criticism of that person.
The article also suggests a set of circumstances that might
constitute reasonable grounds for making an ad hominem criti-
cism in a public forum.
The article provides a general overview of these issues as
they relate to defamation law in Australia. Readers should be
alert to differences in defamation law in other jurisdictions,
although the main points of the article are broadly applicable
elsewhere. For readers requiring practical guidance about writ-
ing online, Pearson (2012) provides a useful guide to the law of
defamation in blogging and social media contexts. Professional
legal advice should be sought if conservation biologists require
guidance that is specific to their circumstances or if legal action
is threatened or anticipated (see also Martin 2017).
The use of ad hominem criticism to respond to arguments
advanced in public forums
Put simply, ad hominem (‘to the person’) criticism seeks to
discredit an argument by attacking the qualities of the arguer,
rather than the merits of the argument (Walton 1998, 2008;
Walton et al. 2008; Dahlman et al. 2013). In political campaigns
at least, ad hominem criticism can be an effective rhetorical
strategy (e.g. see #PUNDITS at http://www.trumptwitterarc-
hive.com/). However, persons who engage in ad hominem
criticism in public debates are sometimes rebuked for engaging
in character assassination, with Lunde (2014) suggesting, for
example, that ad hominem criticism has evolved to the point
where the objective of attacking an argument is now merely the
means by which a critic seeks to justify their real objective,
which is to mount a personal attack on a particular individual,
and to use the cloak of public debate to conceal their own ‘ugly
prejudices’.
In an advocacy context, there are several reasons why
conservation biologists may wish to avoid ad hominem criti-
cism. First, conservation biologists may prefer to conduct
themselves as model advocates who invariably exhibit qualities
of civility and rationality when debating issues, particularly in
public forums where they will often be seen to represent the
scientific or environmental professions (Pielke 2007; Kahan
2010). Second, conservation biologists who use ad hominem
criticism may be seen as unprofessional or unethical and their
professional reputation or standing in the communitymay suffer
as a result. Third, as citizens, conservation biologists have a
moral duty not to cause unreasonable harm to the reputation of
others, which extends to avoiding comments that might unjusti-
fiably impugn the competence or fitness of a person to act in a
particular trade, profession or business. Fourth, ad hominem
criticism tends to invite a response in kind, which can lead to a
series of accusations and counter-allegations, even within cir-
cles of scientific professionals (Tallis and Lubchenco 2014).
Finally, there is always some risk that persons who are subject to
ad hominem criticism may decide to sue in defamation.
Nonetheless, ad hominem criticism can be a legitimate
argumentative strategy in some circumstances. Ad hominem
criticism may be a reasonable means to refute an argument put
forward by another person if the personal characteristics of that
person are relevant to the issue under discussion (Walton 2008).
For example, in political campaigns a candidate’s statements or
commitments are often questioned on a basis of poor character
or previous impropriety. Likewise, a person’s character may
sometimes comprise the actual subject matter of the argument,
as when issues of credibility or integrity arise. Ad hominem
factors may also provide an expedient means of distinguishing
between two equally compelling arguments or equally strong
analyses, particularly if the decision-maker is subject to time or
information constraints (Johnson 2009). Similarly, defects in a
person’s intellectual ‘character’, such as a tendency to be
dogmatic or to avoid considering alternatives, can be relevant
to evaluations of arguments proposed by that person (Battaly
2010). Some ad hominem criticism may also have a plausible
psychological basis, as human decision-making is often influ-
enced by conflicts of interests, cognitive biases, and other issues
relating to our competence or motivation as a decision-maker
(Dahlman et al. 2013; Kahan 2013; Sinatra et al. 2014; Mandel
and Tetlock 2016). In a scientific context, there is broad
acceptance that attributes such as the competence, interests
and previous conduct of scientists and critics are relevant when
evaluating questions about transparency and integrity. For
example, Lewandowsky and Bishop (2016) proposed 10 ‘red-
flag areas’ relating to the characteristics of scientists and critics
and of their conduct (e.g. expertise, conflicts, use of insults or
libel) that could be used to distinguish between constructive
scrutiny and instances of harassment or other abuse. Finally, in a
world where everyone is an expert (Nichols 2017), ad hominem
criticism can provide a means, if imperfect, to encourage
appropriate regard for – as well as robust evaluation of –
scientific expertise in public debates.
Questions about the legitimacy of ad hominem criticism are
particularly acute in public forums, where conservation biolo-
gists may wish to refute or discredit arguments made by
‘experts’ in public debates relating to particular decisions (e.g.
assessments of the possible impacts of proposed developments)
or policy choices (e.g. whether to allow coal seam gas mining in
certain areas). Such ‘expert’ arguments are, at base, an effort by
a particular person to persuade a decision-maker or policy-
maker, or the community generally, to accept a particular
conclusion, evaluation, opinion or recommendation. Arguments
about environmental decisions or policies often involve some
sort of descriptive (the current state of things is V), predictive (if
W happens, then X will occur), normative (we ought to do Y), or
evaluative (Z is good) claim. The quality of an argument reflects,
to a large degree, the way in which those claims are articulated
and the evidence – scientific or otherwise – advanced to support
them.
Advocacy in public forums differs from advocacy in aca-
demic and professional contexts in several key respects. First,
conservation biologists may need to respond to arguments
presented in a diverse range of contexts and advanced by a
broad range of personswho have – orwho profess that they have –
specialised knowledge or skills relevant to the subject matter to
which the argument relates. Examples of such public forums
include: letters to the editor, social media, blogs, online news and
information forums and networks, presentations at public
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meetings, radio interviews, and traditional news media (e.g.
author-written opinion pieces or news articles based on com-
ments supplied to journalists). Persons that might profess to
advance an ‘expert’ argument in those forums include: scientists,
consultants, landholders, businesspersons, industry representa-
tives, government employees, developers, politicians, lawyers,
spokespersons for environmental organisations, company direc-
tors, communitymembers, representatives of community groups,
and retired professionals.
Advocacy in public forums is also different because of the
format in which arguments may be presented. In scholarly or
professional contexts, authors or speakers may have the length
of an article or a presentation in which to develop their argu-
ment. In contrast, ‘experts’ communicating in public forums
will often need to present an argument in an extremely concise
or attenuated form and frequently with few or no supporting
references (or other relevant supporting material). The abbrevi-
ated or incomplete form in which arguments are presented
means that the factual or methodological information necessary
to properly assess the strength of the argument’s claims may be
absent and, further, that the expert’s process of reasoningmay be
inadequately described (Jansen and Sulmasy 2003). As a result,
the plausibility of an argument will often rely, to some degree,
on the authority, credibility and reliability of the expert who
advances it, rather than on any substantive evaluation of the
merits of the argument itself. Arguments in public forums may,
for example, contain conclusory statements that are not sup-
ported by reference to relevant explanatory information or
scientific authorities or to specific empirical findings.
A final difference between advocacy in public and academic/
professional contexts is that people who are subjected to ad
hominem criticism in public forumsmay respond to the criticism
in ways that are idiosyncratic and difficult to predict (Martin
2017). Non-scientists may know little about (or care little for)
the mores by which scientists or environmental professionals go
about debating issues in scholarly or professional contexts.
Persons who have a strong personal commitment to an issue
or a substantial financial stake in a particular outcome may
simply view ad hominem criticism as a direct threat to those
interests and respond in a manner that, to the conservation
biologist, may seem disproportionate or inappropriate. Propo-
nents of a particular argument may sometimes seek to use legal
action to restrain or deter those who speak out against that
argument (Dickman and Danks 2012; Martin 2017). As Justice
Le Miere observed regarding defamation suits in Leighton v
Garnham [No 4] [2016] WASC 134 (29 April 2016) (Supreme
Court of Western Australia):
Defamation actions may be used as a tactic in public debate
mainly for the purpose of silencing the opposition. Such
actions are popularly referred to as SLAPP suits - Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation. In the environmental
context, a defamation writ may be used by a developer as a
tactic to silence residents or environmental groups opposing
the development (paragraph 67).
It should be noted, however, that the risk of a person responding
to ad hominem criticism by suing in defamation is perhaps less a
question of whether the criticism has defamed that person than
whether that person believes that the criticism has defamed
them, and then how strongly that person feels about the per-
ceived slight to their reputation as well as their attitude to using
legal action to seek redress. Themodern onlineworld is awash in
material that could potentially be actionable in defamation but,
for whatever reason, only a minute fraction of that material is
ever acted upon in a way that leads ultimately to the com-
mencement of legal proceedings.
That said, conservation biologists should appreciate the
inflammatory potential of ad hominem criticism. There are least
two features of the sting of ad hominem criticism worth
considering. First, we tend to believe that a person’s conduct
reflects underlying features of their character or competence
rather than the circumstances in which that conduct occurs, even
though circumstantial factors are typically more important than
dispositional factors in the psychology of human decision-
making (Ross and Nisbett 2011). Thus criticisms of a person’s
conduct tend also to imply (or be seen to imply) that there is
something defective or deficient about the person as well.
Second, persons who are criticised will often claim that ad
hominem criticisms convey meanings that are more negative or
more broadly evaluative of that person’s character or conduct
than the critic might have intended. As a practical example, the
first column in Table 1 presents examples of ad hominem
comments while the second column presents possible interpre-
tations of those comments. Meaning is a shared and slippery
beast, and conservation biologists should always be attentive to
the precision of language and the provision of context when
advancing ad hominem comments.
Without limiting the field, the categories of persons who
might respond to ad hominem criticism by suing in defamation
include (1) those who feel genuinely aggrieved by the criticism
and who are not placated by any prelitigation efforts to resolve
the issue (e.g. offers of apology or to retract the allegedly
defamatory material), and (2) those who see legal action as a
means for discouraging public criticism of them. As an example
of the latter, the former Premier of Queensland, Campbell
Newman, sued the radio broadcaster Alan Jones for defamation
during the January 2015 Queensland state election campaign on
a basis that comments by Mr Jones had, among other things,
implied thatMrNewman had prostituted himself by approving a
coal mine after a coal company had given $700 000 to
Mr Newman’s political party, but then discontinued the legal
action in April 2015 after his party lost the state election
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2015; Solomons 2015;
Thomas 2015).
What is ad hominem criticism?
As an argumentative strategy, the ultimate aim of ad hominem
criticism is not to disparage the arguer but to undermine the
argument itself (Walton 1998;Walton 2008). As the plausibility
of an expert argument may depend on the personal authority,
reliability or credibility of the expert who advances it, ad
hominem criticism seeks to undermine that aura of expertise,
trustworthiness, and goodwill (see Horton et al. 2016) by calling
into question the capacity of the expert to have avoided errors
and to havemade correct or appropriate choices in the process of
reasoning towards a particular conclusion or opinion (Battaly
2010; Dahlman et al. 2013).
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Ad hominem criticism often involves an assertion that an
expert lacks some essential quality or possesses some inappro-
priate or objectionable one. The criticism may identify some
particular aspect of the character, conduct or circumstances of
the expert as deficient or defective, thus calling into question
the competence, credibility, motivation, fitness or propriety of
the expert. Table 1 presents examples of ad hominem com-
ments that might be made about experts who advance argu-
ments in public debates about an environmental decision or
policy choice.
While there are any number of ways in which an expert could
be said to be relevantly defective or deficient, ad hominem
criticism might commonly involve an allegation that for some
reason (e.g. inappropriate beliefs, improper interests, insuffi-
cient expertise) the expert applies methods or analyses, or uses
processes of reasoning or interpretation, or employs ways of
selecting and presenting information, that are erroneous, biased,
ineffective, inappropriate, misleading, subjective, dishonest,
unreasonable or otherwise unsatisfactory for the purpose of
rendering an acceptable expert conclusion, evaluation, opinion
or recommendation for a particular subject matter.
The basic formula of an ad hominem criticism might look
something like this:
(1) the expert is deficient or defective because {state reasons
A, B,y};
(2) the expert is therefore fallible and liable to error;
(3) the expert’s argument should therefore be treated as unrea-
sonable or implausible, or as weak and lacking cogency; and
(4) the expert’s argument should therefore not be accepted, or at
least should not be accepted solely on the basis of the
expert’s assertion.
Broadly speaking, the qualities of an expert that might affect
their capacity to make a reasonable argument in a public debate
about an environmental issue are those relating to the expert’s
competence and motivation (Dahlman et al. 2013; Kahan 2013;
Sinatra et al. 2014; Mandel and Tetlock 2016). A defamation
case in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, O’Brien v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] NSWSC 1289 (15
September 2016) (‘O’Brien’), provides an instructive example
of how a critical assessment of the competence and motivation
of an expert can call into question the reliability of their
Table 1. Examples of ad hominem criticisms that might be made in public debates about environmental decisions or policy choices
The first column contains statements that impugn or disparage an expert in some way. Depending on the context, the statements in the first column could be
specific to particular circumstances or could bemore general in application. The second column suggests general qualities of the expert or their conduct that the
expert might claim are implied by or could be inferred from the statement in the first column. The statements in the second column use evaluative phrases that
ascribe a negative or adverse quality to the expert or their conduct
Statement or comment expressly states or reasonably implies that the expert: The statement or comment could be interpreted to mean
that the expert:
presented information in a misleading or deceptive manner is dishonest or lacks integrity
did not consider information which was inconsistent with a particular position is dishonest or lacks objectivity
failed to disclose a relevant financial or personal conflict of interest is unethical or deceptive
invariably provides conclusions, evaluations or opinions that confirm or are otherwise
consistent with a particular position
is biased or partial
interpreted findings in a manner that supported the interests of a source of funding for them is not objective or independent
overstated the probability or consequence of an event because of a lack of relevant experience is not reliable or credible
lacked the requisite knowledge or skills to [insert a professional task: e.g. devise an appropriate
sampling design, carry out a certain procedure, conduct relevant statistical analyses, properly
evaluate the findings]
is not competent
exaggerated the significance of a finding because they had a commercial interest in further
research into or monitoring of an issue
is not independent or trustworthy
produced work which was seriously flawed or erroneous is incompetent
routinely produces work which does not conform to a relevant professional standard is unprofessional (or is negligent)
was indifferent to the risk of [undesirable event] occurring was reckless (or was negligent)
does not possess the professional standing he or she claims to have is dishonest (or is a charlatan)
does not possess a requisite professional qualification is unfit to engage in a business, trade, or profession
is a/an [insert disqualifying circumstance or characteristic] is unfit to engage in a business, trade, or profession
claims to believe in X but acts in a way which is inconsistent with X is hypocritical
people avoid person A because of [insert an adverse circumstance involving A or a negative
characteristic of A]
is disreputable
cannot be trusted to fulfil promises or meet obligations is untrustworthy
breached professional duties by [insert conduct] has committed professional misconduct (or unprofes-
sional conduct)
believes in Y [and a person cannot believe in Y and properly act as an expert in this situation] is biased or prejudiced
often ignores laws that apply to a particular activity acts unlawfully
breached a statutory provision (or regulation) by [doing a certain act or engaging in certain
conduct]
has acted unlawfully
wanted to achieve a particular outcome regardless of the empirical findings did not act in good faith
presents him or herself as a ‘real scientist’ (or a ‘genuine expert’) is a fraud or charlatan
Advocacy and ad hominem criticism Pacific Conservation Biology 95
arguments. The case stemmed from two news articles published
in The Sun-Herald (an Australian newspaper) in 2013 which
alleged that toxic substances had been found in a reserve in
Sydney, and the subsequent critique of those articles by the
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) media analysis
program, Media Watch.
In preparing the two articles the journalist, Natalie O’Brien,
had relied on the views of Andrew Helps, a director of Hg
Recoveries Pty Ltd, who had communicated to Ms O’Brien that
he had a ‘long history in environmental management’ and that
he was ‘an environmental disaster management expert’. Justice
McCallum, who heard the matter at trial, found that while the
articles quoted Mr Helps and a lawyer with the National Toxics
Network, neither of them was ‘even a scientist, let alone one
with appropriate academic qualifications and experience in the
specialised field of assessment of site contamination’ (para-
graph 114). Further, her Honour found that Mr Helps had a
‘vested interest in whipping up community support for further
testing’ of the site (paragraph 146) and observed that:
It was not wise for an investigative journalist to rest on
Mr Helps’s views alone. It is my assessment of the evidence
that he was not a reliable source for the assertions made in
Ms O’Brien’s articles. I am also satisfied that he did not have
the independence required of an expert; he had a commercial
interest in talking up the risk of contamination and clearly
held the [NSW Environmental Protection Authority] in
contempt (paragraph 124).
How can ad hominem criticism defame a person?
The possibility of being sued for defamation, though objectively
unlikely, is a risk that arises when an argument is criticised in a
public forum in a way that impugns or disparages – or, more
relevantly, is believed to impugn or disparage – the person who
advanced the argument. Thus, it should be no surprise that the
tensions between free speech and the law of defamation are
often remarked upon (see, in an Australian context, Pullan 1994;
Walters 2003; Green 2014; Rolph 2016; Bachelard 2017). That
tension exists in Australia, as Rolph (2016) noted, because ‘it is
relatively easy to sue for defamation and relatively difficult to
defend such a claim. All a plaintiff will need to demonstrate is
that the defendant publishedmaterial that identified the plaintiff,
directly or indirectly, and that it was disparaging of their
reputation’.
That said, the reality of defamation proceedings is that they
are often long and complex and, further, are not always very
plaintiff-friendly. Defamation suits may ‘backfire’, for exam-
ple, if they are seen as unjust or as contrary to free speech, or are
legally misconceived (Gray and Martin 2006; Ogle 2007;
Beresford 2015). Defamation actions are also costly to litigate
and it is not uncommon for successful plaintiffs to discover that
their personal contractual liability for legal costs (i.e. to their
own solicitors and legal counsel) exceeds anything they receive
by way of an award of damages (which may be nominal or
minimal unless the defamation is severe) and any award of costs
from the court.
In general, plaintiffs for defamation actions in Australia will
be real people (or what the law calls ‘natural persons’). Public
disquiet over SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Par-
ticipation: Ogle 2007, 2010; Dickman and Danks 2012) actions
inAustralia in the 1990s and early 2000s contributed to statutory
reform of defamation law across all Australian jurisdictions in
the mid-2000s. A consequence of those legislative reforms is
that large corporate entities no longer have a cause of action for
defamation in any Australian state or territory. However, not-
for-profit corporations and small corporations with fewer than
10 employees can still generally sue for defamation, as can
individual directors or employees of corporate entities. Similarly,
while local government bodies and other governmental or public
authorities cannot sue in defamation, employees of those entities
may be able to.
Defamation proceedings often have intense pretrial disputes
over the ‘pleadings’ (i.e. the court documents that present the
parties’ proposed claims and defences). Often these arguments
are, quite literally, a question of semantics as the parties debate
the precise meanings (or ‘imputations’) that arise from the
allegedly defamatory material. A consequence of such disputa-
tion is that even if a defendant is ultimately successful in
defending a defamation action, there can, nonetheless, be some
considerable effluxion of time and financial outlay (Bachelard
2017). As Justice Deane observed in his dissenting opinion in
the High Court defamation case Theophanous v Herald &
Weekly Times Ltd [1994] HCA 46, (1994) 182 CLR 104:
Quite apart from liability in damages, the direct and indirect
costs involved in defending defamation proceedings in a
superior court are likely to represent a crushing burden for the
citizen who is unable to obtain legal aid from some govern-
ment source. The result is that the informed citizenwho is not
foolish or impecunious will inevitably be deterred from
making, repeating, or maintaining a statement which causes
injury to the reputation of another if there be a perceived risk
or actual threat that the publication or further publication of
the statement or a refusal to retract it will give rise to
defamation proceedings. And that will be so even if the
defamatory statement is known or believed to be true (pages
176–177).
While those remarks should not discourage conservation biol-
ogists from speaking out, they should emphasise the care and the
close attention to the accuracy and propriety of the criticism that
ought to be taken when preparing to advance an ad hominem
criticism (see also Martin 2017).
Although lawyers argue a lot over how to distil imputations
from allegedly defamatory material, the test of whether a
distilled imputation is actually defamatory does not have a high
threshold. Material may be defamatory of a person if it exposes
that person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or causes them to be
shunned or avoided, or tends to lower the standing of that person
in the community, or to lower the estimation or esteem in which
they are held, or is likely to cause people to think less of the
person (see Bennett 2016 for a recent discussion of what is
legally capable of being defamatory in Australia). The material
may disparage or discredit the person in the eyes of a particular
group (e.g. their professional peers) or the community generally.
Material may reflect adversely not only upon a person’s private
character, but may also injure a person in their trade, business,
office, or profession.
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A person’s reputation is the focal point for defamation. As
the High Court majority in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v
Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, (2009) 238 CLR 460 (‘Chesterton’)
observed ‘(i)t is disparagement of reputation which is the
essence of an action for defamation’ (page 476). Their Honours
referred to the definition of ‘reputation’ given in a 1923
defamation text, where the term was said to encompass the
‘esteem in which [a person] is held, or the goodwill entertained
towards him, or the confidence reposed in him by other persons,
whether in respect of his personal character, his private or
domestic life, his public, social, professional, or business
qualifications, qualities, competence, dealings, conduct, or
status, or his financial credit’ (page 466). The majority in
Chesterton noted that a person’s reputation ‘comprehends all
aspects of a person’s standing in the community’ including their
reputation in a business, trade or profession.
Assuming that an ad hominem critique does not disparage an
expert’s personal character, it is the potential injury to the expert’s
professional reputation that is likely to be the relevant issue.
Material that relates to the trade, business, or profession of a
person may defame that person if the material attributes to them
either the presence of some qualitywhichwould be detrimental to
the successful conduct of the particular trade, business or profes-
sion or the absence of some quality which is essential to it
(Thorner v Samuels 122 Misc 139, 203 NYS 316 (1923)
(Supreme Court of New York)). For example, in Mularczyk v
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 467 (12
December 2001), a defamation appeal in the New South Wales
Court of Appeal, Justice of Appeal Beazley said that the ‘impu-
tation of dishonesty alleged was the absence of a quality which, I
consider, must be taken as being an essential attribute of a teacher
in the proper performance and discharge of his or her professional
duties’ (paragraph 34). Likewise, in Crampton v Nugawela
[1996] 41 NSWLR 176, a defamation appeal in the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, Acting Chief Justice Mahoney said
that ‘(i)n some cases, a person’s reputation is, in a relevant sense,
his whole life. The reputation of a clerk for financial honesty and
of a solicitor for integrity are illustrations of this’ (page 193).
Material may be defamatory of a person not only if it attributes
certain conditions or characteristics to the person, but also if it
identifies some act that the person has done, or course of conduct
that they have engaged in, that would injure that person’s
reputation in their business or profession (see Capolingua v
Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 156 (24 May 2016)).
A person’s professional competence and their fitness to
engage in a trade, profession or business are integral aspects of
their reputation. As themajority observed inChesterton, material
may be defamatory where the ‘words reflect upon the person’s
fitness or ability to undertake what is necessary to that business,
profession or trade’ (page 468). Similarly, inDrummond-Jackson
v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688 (England and
Wales Court of Appeal), a well-known English defamation case,
Lord Pearson observed that ‘wordsmay be defamatory of a trader
or business man or professional man, though they do not impute
any moral fault or defect of personal charactery if they impute
lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or
efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional
activity’ (pages 698–699). Matters that might impugn the profes-
sional competence or fitness of a person (or their bona fides)
include allegations of: conflicts of interest (or competing inter-
ests), negligence, lack of integrity, dishonesty, corruption, crimi-
nal or unlawful acts or omissions, professional misconduct (or
unprofessional conduct), personal impropriety or wrong-doing,
lack of professionalism, conduct falling well below standards for
the trade, profession, or business, involvement in prior disciplin-
ary proceedings or professional complaints or investigations,
involvement in some notorious event or situation, personal
circumstances (e.g. drug or alcohol addiction) that ought to
disqualify the person, lack of a relevant professional qualifica-
tion, exclusion from or suspension by a professional body,
associationwith notorious persons, or a serious lack of objectivity
or bias because of a personal belief or ideology.
Why ad hominem criticisms should have a strong
factual basis
Consider the following statement and, in particular, the first and
concluding sentences:
We arewell aware that segments of the pesticide industry and
certain paid ‘scientist-spokesmen’ are citing Christmas Bird
Count totals (and other data in AMERICAN BIRDS) as
proving that the bird life of North America is thriving, and
that many species are actually increasing despite the wide-
spread and condemned use ofDDT and other non-degradable
hydrocarbon pesticides.
This, quite obviously, is false and misleading, a distortion
of the facts for the most self-serving of reasons. The truth is
that many species high on the food chain, such as most bird-
eating raptors and fisheaters, are suffering serious declines in
numbers as a direct result of pesticide contamination; there is
now abundant evidence to prove this. In addition, with the
constant diminution of natural habitat, especially salt- and
freshwater marshes, it is self-evident that species frequenting
these habitats are less common than formerly.
The apparent increases in numbers of species and indivi-
duals on the Christmas Bird Counts have, in most cases,
nothing to do with real population dynamics. They are the
result of ever-increasing numbers of birders in the field,
better access to the Count areas, better knowledge ofwhere to
find the birds within each area, and increasing sophistication
in identification.
With increased local coverage by the press of Christmas
Bird Count activities, it is important that Count spokesmen
reiterate the simple and truthful fact that what we are seeing
is result of not more birds, but more birders. Any time you
hear a ‘scientist’ say the opposite, you are in the presence of
someonewho is being paid to lie, or is parroting something he
knows little about.
That statement was published in April 1972 by Robert S. Arbib,
Jr as a foreword to an issue of American Birds, a bimonthly
journal devoted to the birds of North America which was then
published by the National Audubon Society. Mr Arbib, the
journal’s editor, and other members of the National Audubon
Society were concerned about scientists who advocated that the
continued use of DDT was acceptable because the results of the
annual Audubon Society Christmas Bird Count showed an
increase in the number of birds observed over the preceding 30
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years despite the increasing use of pesticides in that period.
MrArbib’s statement was subsequently reported inAugust 1972
by the journalist John Devlin in an article in The New York
Times. The newspaper article, along with Mr Arbib’s foreword
in American Birds, eventually led to a defamation trial and then
to an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the
2nd Circuit, Edwards v National Audubon Society, Inc. 556 F 2d
113 (2nd Circuit, 1977) (‘Edwards’).
The defamation proceedings inEdwardswere unusual in that
Mr Arbib did not name any scientists in his statement. Ultimate-
ly, Mr Arbib had provided Mr Devlin with the names of
scientists mentioned in a journal article by Roland Clement, a
Vice President of the National Audubon Society, which had
been published in the Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review in January 1972 (Clement 1972). The article,
entitled ‘The Pesticide Controversy’, had described several
‘distorted’ and ‘extreme’ claims based upon the Christmas Bird
Count that had been made by scientists said to support the use of
DDT. Mr Devlin subsequently published the names of those
scientists in The New York Times article. Although the scientist
plaintiffs in Edwards were ultimately unsuccessful in their
defamation action, conservation biologists should understand
that ad hominem criticism can still be defamatory of a person
even if the text of the criticism does not name or otherwise
expressly identify that person. The law of defamation in
Australia is such that a ‘nameless’ ad hominem comment may
still defame a person if at least some recipients of the comment
would nonetheless be able to identify that person using extrinsic
information, such their personal knowledge of the relationship
between the critic and that person.
The ad hominem crux of Mr Arbib’s statement is, of course,
the ‘paid liar’ comment in its first and concluding sentences.
Such a comment is clearly capable of being defamatory because
it impugns the motives (or competence) of persons who advance
certain arguments. Further, the meanings of the phrases ‘paid
‘‘scientist-spokesmen’’’ and ‘someone who is being paid to lie’
are clear enough on their face. Indeed, as Chief Judge Kaufman
observed in his opinion in the appeal judgment in Edwards: ‘No
allegation could be better calculated to ruin an academic
reputation. And, to say a scientist is paid to lie implies corrup-
tion, and not merely a poor opinion of his scientific integrity’.
Remarkably, however, Mr Arbib did not have any factual
basis for the allegation. Chief Judge Kaufman noted that, at trial,
Mr Arbib had testified that he had ‘never intended to portray
anyone in particular as a venal prevaricator’ and that the
comment ‘merely expressed his belief that many supporters of
DDT use were spokesmen for the pesticide industry’ even
though Mr Arbib knew of no one in particular that he could
‘with assurance call a ‘‘paid liar’’’.
The next section will further discuss why the factual founda-
tions for ad hominem allegations are particularly significant in a
defamation context. However, two points may be made here.
First, it is often exceedingly difficult to prove that something is
‘true’ about a person in a defamation proceeding, particularly
where the information needed to substantiate an allegation is not
easily accessible (e.g. evidence of financial linkages between
particular scientists and particular pesticide companies) or
where the allegation involves an evaluation of that person’s
character, expertise, performance, or other personal attribute. A
second, and related, issue is that a defendant in a defamation
proceeding will not generally be able to prove anything about
the mental state or thought processes of the person they have
criticised. Thus, ad hominem criticisms that impute motives or
intentions to an expert, or which attempt to characterise what the
expert might have been thinking at a particular point in time or in
relation to a particular task are inherently problematic.
On that basis, Mr Arbib’s statement that ‘you are in the
presence of someone who is being paid to lie’ fails because it
does not adequately articulate a factual basis for the allegation,
while the statement that a person ‘is parroting something he
knows little about’ fails both because of its lack of a factual
grounding and possibly also because it imputes something about
the mental state or intention of a person.
However, the fact that defendants may find it difficult to
establish certain issues of fact in a defamation proceeding does
not mean that conservation biologists should avoid making
allegations about conflicts of interest, or a person’s lack of
relevant expertise, or other similar matters. But these accusa-
tions should be carefully formulated. Thus, by way of an
example, an allegation of a substantive conflict of interest
should be advanced on the basis of factual evidence as to the
objective circumstances of the expert or their conduct at a
particular point in time along with specific submissions as to
the relevant content of the competing or conflicting duties or
interests that were (or are) impinging on the expert – and not on
the basis of assertions about the expert’s subjective state of mind
or intention (e.g. that the expert ‘wanted’ an outcome that was
supportive of the interests of a funding source).
Why ad hominem criticisms are often best presented as a
statement of opinion
In a defamation context, the question of whether an ad hominem
criticism makes a statement of fact about the person or states an
opinion about that person is important because it affects the
defences that might be available to the critic, namely common
law or statutory justification (‘truth’) or common law fair
comment/statutory honest opinion.
Broadly speaking, if a proposed ad hominem criticism would
allege that, as a statement of fact, the expert did a certain act or is
a certain type of person or has a certain quality, then the
conservation biologist needs to be in a position where they
could prove that the allegation is ‘true’ using relevant evidence
(e.g. documents, statements of persons who witnessed the
conduct in question) which could be used in legal proceedings
if necessary. That evidence should either be at hand or be
otherwise readily accessible and must also be admissible in
court (e.g. not based on hearsay).
If, however, a proposed ad hominem criticism would allege
something about the expert that is not a straightforward issue of
fact, the preferable approach is to present the criticism as a
statement of opinion that is based upon a clear set of supporting
facts. Thus, for example, if a proposed ad hominem criticism
would, as a statement of opinion, attribute a certain quality to the
expert or otherwise evaluate the expert’s character, conduct or
circumstances, then the conservation biologist should be sure to:
(1) clearly present the characterisation of the expert as an
‘opinion’ rather than as an allegation of fact;
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(2) give the specific facts which underlie that opinion; and
(3) indicate the evidence upon which those facts are based.
It is vital that the opinion be clearly framed as a comment on
particular supporting facts, such that a reasonable person who
encountered the material would typically say, ‘I do/do not agree
with that comment’.
Comments that are statements of opinion about the character,
conduct or circumstances of the expert are evaluative judg-
ments, in that they attribute a certain value (i.e. merit, worth,
quality, or significance) to a subject matter (Fournier 1995;
Scriven 1995, 2015). As such, the comments should: (1) indicate
clear criteria for the evaluation (e.g. the specific skills or areas of
knowledge that are relevant to the conduct being evaluated);
(2) identify a relevant standard against which the expert is to be
judged (e.g. the level of expertise that would be expected of a
particular sort of ‘expert’ in the circumstances); and (3) provide
the facts or other information that underlie the overall attribution
of value to the character, conduct or circumstances of the expert.
The New South Wales defamation case O’Brien contains an
instructive example of the value of clearly expressing ad
hominem criticisms as either a statement of fact or a statement
of opinion. In O’Brien, Justice McCallum assessed whether an
imputation of ‘irresponsible journalism’ was conveyed as a fact
or as comment or opinion in the Media Watch program, and
observed that:
I am satisfied that the viewer (or reader) would understand
that attribution to be conveyed as the comment or opinion of
the presenter [Mr Paul Barry]. Indeed, in my view, the matter
complained of provides a textbook illustration of the opera-
tion of the defence of fair comment. The structure of the
programme is to present, factually, something that was
reported in the media; to present, factually, what is said to
be wrong with it and to pass comment on the appropriateness
of the relevant conduct by reference to a normative standard
for themedia. The programmemakes several comments as to
what The Sun-Herald ‘should’ have done or ‘should’ do. The
tone of the programme is the tone of critique. With great
respect to Mr Barry, his manner of presentation is, dare I say,
opinionated. I am satisfied that the ordinary reasonable viewer
(and reader) would have understood his remarks, in their
defamatory meaning, as his comment or opinion, not fact.
Specifically, the reader would have understood Mr Barry
to be stating (as fact) that Ms O’Brien prepared an article
reporting that toxic substances had been found at levels that
pose a risk to the public; to be stating (as fact) that she failed
to consult experts as part of her preparation of that article; to
be stating (as fact) that she got it wrong and to be making the
comment or expressing the opinion, based on those facts, that
her conduct was irresponsible and created unnecessary
concern in the community (paragraphs 61–62).
In this context, it is also instructive to revisit Edwards and
consider whether the ‘paid liar’ comment might be reformulated
into amore acceptable form.Although the issuewas not relevant
to the defamation proceedings in Edwards, it is likely that the
‘paid liar’ commentwould have been taken as a statement of fact
rather than as a statement of opinion because the text of the
foreword in American Birds did not (1) contain any factual basis
for the allegation and (2) state or otherwise indicate that that
allegation was Mr Arbib’s opinion. The text below suggests a
recasting of the concluding sentence (the revised text is
underlined):
y the simple and truthful fact that what we are seeing is
result of not more birds, but more birders. Those scientists
who have persisted in misinterpreting the results of the
Christmas Bird Counts certainly have had time to learn from
our patient and repeated explanations (both in correspon-
dence to them and in information we have published about
the Christmas Bird Counts) of how the information should be
used. In my opinion, their conduct in continuing to promul-
gate their views without any reference to, or constructive
engagement with, our repeated criticisms evinces a lack of
professional integrity in this regard. They are free, of course,
to independently analyse the Bird Count data and then to
reach their own independent conclusions, but the relevant
professional standards for scientific objectivity in these
circumstances requires them to at least consider the inter-
pretations we have suggested to them and then to respond to
our views (by critiquing them, if necessary) in the course of
any public communications they may make advancing their
own views.
This alternative version of the ‘paid liar’ comment may still be
defamatory of any individuals that could reasonably be said to
have been identified by the comment. However, this version lays
out the factual basis for the ad hominem comment and more
clearly presents the allegation as a statement of opinion rather
than as a statement of fact. The revised text uses the phrase ‘in
my opinion’, for example, and specifically sets out a clear
standard of evaluation for the conduct in question. An advantage
of the clear expression of the comment as a statement of opinion
is that certain defences to defamation (namely fair comment and
honest opinion) become more feasible to make out. Further,
even though the statements in the alternative versionmay still be
defamatory of persons, any potentially defamatory meanings
would be at a lower level of seriousness than in the original
version.
As a general guide, conservation biologists may often find
that, in the course of formulating ad hominem criticisms, they
can readily replace a particular evaluative phrase (e.g. ‘reck-
lessly argued’) that is both highly derogatory and difficult to
prove, with another evaluative phrase (e.g. ‘concluded without
adequate empirical foundation’) that is more precisely stated
and less easily cast as a personal attack, and that is also more
straightforward to establish on the basis of a comparison
between the specific conduct of the expert (which the text of
the criticism describes) and a relevant standard for that conduct
(which the text of the criticism also sets out). It should now be
clear that ad hominem criticisms should never stand by them-
selves (e.g. as a sort of ‘offhand’ comment) but should always
be accompanied by relevant factual and explanatory material.
Can critiques of the methods, analyses and conclusions of
an expert be defamatory?
It is sometimes the case that even criticisms that are directed to
the methods, analyses or logic applied by an expert, or to the
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conclusions that they reach, can bear upon the competence of
that expert in a way that might be considered defamatory of
them. For example, in a Welsh–English case, Bowker v The
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds [2011] EWHC 737
(QB) (25 March 2011) (England and Wales High Court), the
claimants (Mr and Mrs Bowker), who specialised in grouse
fieldwork, brought an action in libel against the Royal Society
for the Protection of Birds (the RSPB) on the basis of three
documents (an email, a written critique, and a letter) that had
been published (i.e. communicated) in October 2007 by RSPB
staff. The three documents all contained critiques, in various
form, of a peer-reviewed scientific paper about black grouse
conservation that the claimants and one other person had pub-
lished in September 2007 in the journal Wildlife Biology
(Bowker et al. 2007). The claimants argued that the three RSPB
publications conveyed several meanings that were defamatory
of them (Table 2). At an early stage of the defamation pro-
ceedings, the RSPB applied to the court for an initial ruling as to
whether the words in the publications were capable of bearing
the meanings the claimants argued for (i.e. the pleaded mean-
ings). The RSPB’s application was successful and the matter
never progressed to a trial. In her reasons for decision, Justice
Sharp observed, in relation to one of the RSPB publications:
I turn next to the questionwhether theGrant email is arguably
defamatory of the Claimants, albeit not in the pleaded
meanings. It is arguable in my view that it isy albeit at a
lower level of seriousness than that contended for at present.
In particular, while the relevant words are arguably capable
of reflecting adversely on the Claimants’ capabilities and
judgment, I do not consider even when read in the context of
the RSPB Critique, as I have said, that they are capable of
‘imputing any moral default or defect of personal character’
on their party But in my view, the Grant email arguably
raises questions as to the Claimants’ judgment and abilities
as field workers (but not their bona fides) in using high
disturbance methods which may have affected the mortality
of chicks which their fieldwork was supposed to measure. In
addition, it is arguable in my view that a reasonable reader
(bearing in mind the nature of the readership in question)
could also conclude the words reflected on their abilities by
suggesting they had coauthored a paper for publication in a
peer-reviewed journal which fell below the generally accept-
ed standard for such work, by failing to detail the methods
which were fundamental to the results (paragraph 55).
These comments by Justice Sharp suggest a certain irony,
namely that the greater the deficiency or defectiveness of the
particular methods, analyses, logical approaches, or conclusions
in question and, thus, the greater the severity of the words that
are used to critique them, the more likely it is that those words
will convey meanings that are potentially defamatory of the
persons responsible for those methods, analyses, logical
approaches, or conclusions.
It must immediately be said that the fact that any words of
critique might be capable of conveying a meaning that is
defamatory of certain individuals does not mean that the persons
who state those words will be found to have defamed those
individuals. The courts have long recognised the benefits of
robust scientific debate and the need to evaluate statements
made in the course of scientific debate in an appropriate context.
In Australia, for example, the statutory and common law
defences of qualified privilege will operate in certain contexts
where the exchange of ‘scientific’ views might occur, particu-
larly where issues of public interest are articulated. However, in
Australia, statutory qualified privilege will only be available if
the court determines that the conduct of the defendant in
publishing the material was reasonable in the circumstances.
The considerations that bear upon the issue of reasonableness
will vary with circumstances of individual cases, but it may be
difficult for a defendant to prove that their conduct was reason-
able if, for example, their critique was deficient (e.g. it was
Table 2. Some of themeanings that the claimants in theWelsh–English libel caseBowker v TheRoyal Society for the Protection of Birds [2011] EWHC
737 (QB) (25 March 2011) (England and Wales High Court), argued were: (a) capable of being conveyed by three documents (an email, a written
critique, and a letter) communicated by staff of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, and (b) defamatory of them
The court found that the meanings were not capable of being conveyed by the words used in the three publications. The words in bold below are the main
evaluative phrases in the proposed meanings
Field methods
’ recklessly used particularly intensive yet completely untried and untested field methods, about which [name of the person making the comment] was
most concerned and which he would never condone, involving unprecedented and dangerous levels of disturbance to black grouse chicks and juveniles,
such methods being the most likely cause of a decline in the numbers of black grouse at Lake Vyrnwy
’ incompetently measured broods at a time of year that was too late to draw any meaningful comparisons with other sites and studies
’ incompetently used an inaccurate lek count for the year 2000, which renders their entire study worthless
Disclosure of methods
’ improperly failed to declare such methods in their published paper
’ dishonestly misled readers of their published paper by deliberately omitting important information about the methods that had been included in a
preceding report
’ dishonestly (or at least incompetently) presented the results of their study in a scientific paper as if the results were of value when they knew (or at least
should have known) that the results were biased and misleading
Analyses
’ incompetently neglected to consider environmental effects as a reason for the reported low breeding success
’ incompetently neglected to consider rainfall as a reason for the reported low breeding success
’ cynically (or at least incompetently) attributed the low black grouse survival rate (that they had most likely caused themselves) to predators
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illogical, poorly supported or inaccurate, or it made excessive or
specious allegations, or it was otherwise inconsistent with an
appropriate standard of care and diligence) or the motivation of
the defendant was somehow questionable (e.g. they did not
actually believe some or all of the criticisms they advanced, or
they made the criticisms principally to publicly embarrass or
disparage the expert, or they received some form of financial
benefit for making the criticism). Further, at least in an Australia
context, the edges of what would be considered to be part of a
‘scientific debate’ are not particularly clear, given the diversity
of public forums that now exist outside of traditional scholarly
and professional contexts and the range of persons who might
now seek to advance an ‘expert’ argument of some kind in
relation to a particular environmental decision or policy choice.
That should again emphasise the degree of care that ought to be
taken when making an ad hominem criticism.
Another Welsh–English libel case, British Chiropractic
Association v Singh [2011] 1 WLR 133 (England and Wales
Court of Appeal) (‘Singh’), encouraged a process of legislative
reform that led to the passage of the Defamation Act 2013
(United Kingdom). The defendant in Singh, a scientist and a
science writer, had published an article on the ‘Comment and
Debate’ page of the Guardian in April 2008 that included the
following statement:
The British Chiropractic Association claims that their mem-
bers can help treat children with colic, sleeping and feeding
problems, frequent ear infections, asthma and prolonged
crying, even though there is not a jot of evidence. This
organisation is the respectable face of the chiropractic
profession and yet it happily promotes bogus treatments.
The England andWales Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s
appeal, on a basis that Dr Singh’s statement that there was ‘not a
jot of evidence’ to support the claims of the British Chiropractic
Association was a statement of opinion and, further, was an
opinion that was supported by reasons. The Court of Appeal
observed that it would respectfully adopt remarks made by
Judge Easterbrook in Underwager v Salter 22 F 3d 730 (7th
Circuit, 1994), an appeal case before the United States Court of
Appeals (7th Circuit), in which his Honour stated that:
[Plaintiffs] cannot, by simply filing suit and crying ‘character
assassination!’, silence those who hold divergent views, no
matter how adverse those views may be to plaintiffs’ inter-
ests. Scientific controversies must be settled by the methods
of science rather than by the methods of litigation.yMore
papers, more discussion, better data, and more satisfactory
models – not larger awards of damages – mark the path
towards superior understanding of the world around us.
Conservation biologists should be aware, then, that critiques of
the methods, analyses, logical approaches, or conclusions of an
expert have the potential to convey meanings that are defama-
tory of the expert and, indeed, to motivate an expert to sue in
defamation. That said, the defamatory meanings conveyed by
criticisms of the methods, analyses, logical approaches, or
conclusions of an expert are likely to be less serious and more
capable of falling within the penumbra of notions of ‘scientific
debate’ and ‘public interest’ than those conveyed by ad homi-
nem comments about the expert. That is particularly so if the
facts that comprise or underlie an ad hominem criticism are
contentious or difficult to prove. For example, in an appellate
decision (see Competitive Enterprise Institute v Mann, District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, 22 December 2016) relating to
the ongoing defamation action of the climatologist Michael
Mann in the United States (see Adler 2016, 2017, for an over-
view), Senior Judge Ruiz observed that:
To the extent statements in appellants’ articles take
issue with the soundness of Dr Mann’s methodology and
conclusions – i.e. with ideas in a scientific or political debate –
they are protected by the First Amendment. But defamatory
statements that are personal attacks on an individual’s honesty
and integrity and assert or imply as fact that DrMann engaged
in professional misconduct and deceit to manufacture the
results he desired, if false, do not enjoy constitutional protec-
tion and may be actionable y Tarnishing the personal
integrity and reputation of a scientist important to one side
may be a tactic to gain advantage in a no-holds-barred debate
over global warming. That the challenged statements were
made as part of such debate provides important context and
requires careful parsing in light of constitutional standards.
But if the statements assert or imply false facts that defame the
individual, they do not find shelter under the First Amendment
simply because they are embedded in a larger policy debate
(pages 57–58).
Those remarks were said in a context of the express constitu-
tional protections afforded to free speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Nonetheless,
they emphasise, in a general way, the value of formulating ad
hominem criticisms carefully and precisely, particularly where
they make allegations about the bona fides of person.
Can a critique of a single item of work support a more
general imputation about the competence of an expert?
This question was considered in a defamation case in the
Supreme Court of New South Wales: seeWarren v Tweed Shire
Council [2002] NSWSC 211 (22 March 2002) and Warren v
Tweed Shire Council [2002] NSWSC 1105 (22 November
2002). In essence, the case involved a dispute over whether a
document that commented, sometimes critically, on a draft
impact assessment report conveyed imputations that were
defamatory of the authors of that draft impact assessment report.
The two plaintiffs (an environmental consultant and an envi-
ronmental consulting company, respectively) had sued the first
and second defendants (the Tweed Shire Council and another
environmental consulting company, respectively) in relation to
the publication in April 2001 of material in a document referred
to as a ‘Local Environment Study’. The Local Environment
Study had been prepared by the second defendant for the Tweed
Shire Council as a commentary on a draft Species Impact
Statement for a proposed development in the Tweed Shire that
the plaintiffs had produced.
In Warren v Tweed Shire Council [2002] NSWSC 1105 (22
November 2002), Justice Simpson considered whether to grant
leave to the plaintiffs to file an amended statement of claim (a
pleading) that pleaded a revised set of imputations, the plain-
tiffs’ originally pleaded imputations having been ‘struck out’ in
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the earlier March 2002 decision by Justice Levine. The first
plaintiff pleaded that the Local Environment Study conveyed
three imputations which were defamatory of him, namely
that he:
(1) was incompetent as an environmental consultant in that
he prepared a draft Species Impact Statement for the use of
Tweed Shire Council which failed to identify and consider a
significant koala population, failed to give adequate consid-
eration to the requirements of the Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, and contained an
inadequate fauna habitat analysis for a number of species
including the Wallum froglet and Wallum tree frog;
(2) negligently prepared a draft Species Impact Statement
[repeats text in (1) above]; and
(3) as a professional environmental consultant, was guilty of
unprofessional conduct in that he prepared a draft Species
Impact Statement for the use of Tweed Shire Council which
was so seriously deficient that it warranted criticism.
The imputations for the second plaintiff (the company) mirrored
those imputations. Justice Simpson refused to grant leave to the
plaintiffs to file an amended statement of claim in respect of any
of the revised imputations that were pleaded. For the first
imputation, relating to the allegation of incompetence, her
Honour followed the earlier ruling of Justice Levine to the effect
that such an imputation was incapable of being conveyed by the
Local Environment Study because that matter referred only to
one specific piece of work by the plaintiffs (i.e. the draft Species
Impact Statement). As regards the third imputation, Justice
Simpson observed that the imputation lacked specificity but
that, further, there was ‘a difference between a document which
makes a criticism of the work of an individual, and one which
asserts deficiencies that warrant criticism. In this case the matter
complained of [i.e. the Local Environment Study] certainly
criticises the work of the first plaintiff but that is not the same as
saying that thework ‘‘was so seriously deficient that it warranted
criticism’’’ (paragraph 23).
In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Warton [2002] NSWCA 377
(21 November 2002), the New South Wales Court of Appeal
considered the broader issue of whether the specific conduct
alleged in a particular case could support a general imputation
about a person. The case related to the publication in May 2000
of an article in The Daily Telegraph (an Australian newspaper)
entitled ‘Bout a sucker punch’ relating to a proposed boxing
match between Kostya Tszyu and Julio Cesar Chavez. Justice of
Appeal Heydon observed:
The article does not suggest that the plaintiff’s act is other
than an isolated act of dishonesty, but it does suggest that it is
a most serious act of dishonesty. It involved gambling with
one man’s health (that of Chavez), exploiting another man’s
reputation (that of Tszyu), doing it only formoney, doing it in
a way which was attracting great criticism in America, both
among the public and the authorities which regulate boxing,
and doing it in a manner justifying the arrest of the plaintiff.
While a person can do a dishonest thing without being
thought a dishonest person, some things are so dishonest that
one can infer that only a dishonest personwould do them. The
activities attributed to the plaintiff in the article are so
extensive, serious and risky that it is open to ordinary
reasonable readers to infer that only a dishonest personwould
have done them (paragraph 61).
It is important, then, for an ad hominem criticism to be formu-
lated so that there can be no doubt as to whether the criticism
makes only a specific, situation-specific critique of the expert
(or, more specifically, an item of their work or an instance of
their conduct) or whether the criticism makes some more gen-
eral critique of the qualities (or lack thereof) of the expert.
Statements that are imprecise or lacking in context will leave the
door open for persons to claim that the words mean more than
what might have been intended or that might have been neces-
sary to achieve the objective of the criticism.
What are reasonable grounds for ad hominem criticism
when advocating in public forums?
Ultimately, it is for each individual to decide whether a partic-
ular circumstance warrants the use of ad hominem criticism and
to consider the risks and benefits of that approach. This article
proposes that conservation biologists should limit the use of ad
hominem criticism to situations where the proposed criticism
would be: (1) legitimately made, (2) properly responsive,
(3) well substantiated, (4) plausible, and (5) complementary to a
broader critique. Those grounds can be summarised as follows:
(1) Legitimately made. The criticism should be communicat-
ed solely for the purpose of contributing to public debate
about an issue of public interest. The propriety or good faith
of a critic’smotives in advancing an ad hominem criticism is
relevant in a defamation context because some defences
may be unavailable if the conduct of the critic in making the
defamatory statements was not reasonable in the circum-
stances – as when, for example, the critic knew the allega-
tions to be false or made them with an improper purpose or
with reckless indifference to their truth or falsity or other-
wise lacked an honest belief in what was communicated.
Conservation biologists should always advance ad hominem
criticisms with appropriate care and diligence and give
careful consideration to the purpose and value of the
criticisms they make. In particular, conservation biologists
should give some thought to the standards of professional
integrity and collegiality that should apply in the circum-
stances and consider whether, if viewed objectively, a
proposed ad hominem criticism could reasonably be seen
as gratuitous, irrelevant, improper, or malicious, or as
involving innuendo, or as made for some improper purpose
or motive. Useful perspective can often be gained by asking
professional colleagues and laypersons to comment (on a
confidential basis) on a proposed ad hominem criticism.
Particular care should be taken in circumstances where a
conservation biologist could be said to derive some form of
financial benefit by making the ad hominem criticism.
(2) Properly responsive. The criticism should respond to an
argument that is incomplete because the form of the argu-
ment lacks key factual or methodological information or
adequate detail about the process of reasoning, or is other-
wise insufficient to support a robust critique of its merits. If
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the argument is adequately presented, then generally there
will be no practical necessity for ad hominem criticism.
(3) Well substantiated. The criticism should have an adequate
factual basis, regardless of whether the criticism constitutes
a statement of opinion or a statement of fact. Further,
conservation biologists should carefully formulate the con-
text in which ad hominem criticism appears so that it
presents a clear framework for how the criticism is to be
interpreted. For example, it will often be useful for the
overall communication in which an ad hominem criticism
appears to contain a statement of purpose that indicates:
(a) how the overall communication (including the ad homi-
nem criticism) contributes to public debate about an issue of
public interest, (b) the intended audience for the communi-
cation, and (c) why the members of that intended audience
will have some particular interest in the information being
conveyed. Such material may assist in making a defence of
qualified privilege available in certain circumstances.
(4) Plausible. The criticism should propose a plausible link
between the qualities of expert that are impugned and the
plausibility or soundness of the argument that the expert has
advanced. This linkage will generally relate to the compe-
tence or motivation of the expert. Such a linkage adds a vital
component of reasonableness to the ad hominem criticism.
Without such a link, the ad hominem criticism may amount
to, or be interpreted as, a mere personal attack.
(5) Complementary. The criticism should not generally be
presented in isolation or as the primary component of a
response to an expert argument but, rather, as one compo-
nent of a broader critique of the expert argument, on a basis
that criticisms should first consider the merits of an argu-
ment to the extent possible and then, if the circumstances
warrant, proceed to the making of ad hominem criticisms.
A final point is to reiterate that particular care must be taken
when making allegations about the bona fides of a person.
Although it is appropriate and very much in the public interest
for conservation biologists to speak out when, for example, an
expert has engaged in some level of impropriety or misconduct
or has failed, without good reason, to disclose a significant
conflict of interest, conservation biologists are not, by training
or experience, investigative journalists. Martin (2017) provides
some useful practical guidance for conservation biologists who
wish to speak out about issues that may raise some controversy
or dispute.
Conclusion
Ad hominem criticism can be an effective strategy for dis-
crediting an argument advanced in a public forum. However, the
circumstances in which ad hominem criticism will be appro-
priate are relatively narrow and careful thought should be given
to the risks and benefits of directing a critique towards the
qualities of an expert rather than to the merits of their argument.
If the advantages do seem to outweigh the risks, then conser-
vation biologists may wish to consider some of the points made
here, particularly the importance of providing a strong factual
basis for the criticism and the value of presenting the criticism as
a statement of opinion based on a clear set of facts. Critically, ad
hominem criticisms should never be deployed as an informal or
rhetorical remark, but only as a carefully considered and well
supported comment.
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